In-Depth Analysis· Cyprus Lebanon Israel EEZ agreement Turkish Cypriot rights objection

Lebanon 2007 and Israel 2010: Why Ankara Says the Greek Cypriot EEZ Agreements Ignore Turkish Cypriot Rights

Explainer on the 2007 Cyprus–Lebanon and 2010 Cyprus–Israel EEZ agreements, Lebanon's response, and why Ankara and the TRNC object on Turkish Cypriot rights.

By Territorial Brief Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,897 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The Greek Cypriot administration signed an EEZ delimitation agreement with Lebanon on 17 January 2007 and another with Israel on 17 December 2010; both were concluded without Turkish Cypriot participation.
The 2007 Cyprus–Lebanon text was never ratified by Lebanon's parliament, and Lebanon later deposited different southern coordinates with the UN, so the three-way maritime picture was disputed from the start.
Ankara and the TRNC argue that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the 1960 Republic, hold equal inherent rights over offshore resources that no unilateral delimitation can extinguish.
Ankara's remedy is joint decision-making and revenue sharing, reflected in the TRNC hydrocarbon proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 and in President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference.
Under the general rule that treaties bind only their parties, Ankara holds that the agreements cannot affect Türkiye's continental shelf or Turkish Cypriot rights, while Nicosia, Beirut and Jerusalem each reject parts of that reading.

Why It Matters

The 2007 Cyprus–Lebanon and 2010 Cyprus–Israel agreements are bilateral exclusive economic zone (EEZ) delimitations signed by the Greek Cypriot administration, which Ankara says cannot speak alone for the whole island. Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) object that the texts ignore the equal, inherent rights of Turkish Cypriots over offshore hydrocarbons. The dispute shapes licensing, drilling and energy-cooperation politics across the Eastern Mediterranean.

This briefing does not repeat the 2003 Cyprus–Egypt analysis. For wider context, see the Maritime Zones Brief.

Background

Both agreements were concluded under the general delimitation rules of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 74 and 83. These call for delimitation 'by agreement on the basis of international law' to reach an 'equitable solution'. Cyprus and Lebanon are UNCLOS parties. Türkiye and Israel are not.

What the agreements delimit

Agreement	Signed	Parties	What it delimits
Cyprus–Lebanon	17 January 2007, Beirut	Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration) and Lebanon	A median-line-based EEZ boundary between the two coasts, with a southern end point left to be fixed with Israel
Cyprus–Israel	17 December 2010, Nicosia	Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration) and Israel	A median-line-based EEZ boundary between the two coasts, with provisions for the end points with third states to be settled with those states

In both cases the line is drawn between the southern coast of Cyprus and the opposite mainland coast. Neither text provides for Turkish Cypriot participation, a Turkish Cypriot signature or revenue sharing with the Turkish Cypriot community.

Chronology

1959–1960: The Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee establish the Republic of Cyprus as a partnership of two founding peoples. See the Cyprus Sovereignty Brief.
2003: The Greek Cypriot administration signs an EEZ agreement with Egypt. That agreement is covered in a separate analysis because Ankara links it to Türkiye's own continental shelf.
17 January 2007: The Cyprus–Lebanon agreement is signed.
2009–2010: Lebanon's government and parliament do not ratify the 2007 text. In 2010 Lebanon deposits its own maritime coordinates with the UN, placing its southern limit further south than the point implied in the 2007 agreement. Israel disputes that Lebanese line.
17 December 2010: The Cyprus–Israel agreement is signed. Lebanon protests to the UN that it affects Lebanese rights in the area still under dispute with Israel.
2011: Lebanon adopts Law 163 and Decree 6433 defining its maritime zones. On 19 September 2011 the Greek Cypriot administration begins unilateral drilling. On 21 September 2011 Türkiye and the TRNC sign a continental shelf delimitation agreement.
2009 and 2012: The Turkish state petroleum company TPAO receives exploration licences.
October 2022: A separate US-mediated Lebanon–Israel maritime arrangement is announced, which resolves much of the dispute that the 2007 and 2010 texts left open. Readers should check the current status of any later Cyprus–Lebanon arrangements, because details may have changed after publication.

Key Players & Positions

Greek Cypriot administration (Republic of Cyprus)

Nicosia states that it acts as a sovereign UNCLOS state party entitled to delimit its EEZ by agreement with neighbours. It says that hydrocarbon proceeds belong to all Cypriots and that Turkish Cypriots will benefit, including through a natural resources fund, once a comprehensive settlement is reached. The European Union has repeatedly expressed support for Cyprus's sovereign rights in its Council conclusions.

Lebanon

Lebanon's record is mixed, and this is why the 2007 text is often described as incomplete. Lebanese officials did sign in 2007, but the agreement was not ratified by parliament. In 2010 and 2011 Lebanon deposited coordinates and enacted domestic legislation that differ from the 2007 geometry in the south. Lebanon also told the UN that the Israel–Cyprus text must not prejudice Lebanese rights. Beirut's objection concerns its own boundary with Israel, not the rights of Turkish Cypriots.

Israel

Israel treats the Cyprus agreement as a normal bilateral delimitation. It disputes Lebanon's southern coordinates and has said in its own communications that its boundary with Lebanon is a separate matter.

Türkiye and the TRNC

Ankara and the TRNC reject the agreements as unilateral acts. Their objections are set out in the next section.

United Nations

The UN secretariat records coordinates deposited by states under UNCLOS. It does not adjudicate their validity, and no UN body or court has ruled on the Turkish Cypriot argument.

🇹🇷 Official Legal Stance · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's position rests on two pillars: delimiting maritime jurisdiction areas by the principle of equity, and protecting the equal, inherent rights of Turkish Cypriots. The points below summarize it, as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and TRNC authorities.

Türkiye's Legal Stance

Equal and inherent rights. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry's published statements on maritime jurisdiction areas, Turkish Cypriots are co-founders and equal co-owners of Cyprus, and their rights over offshore resources cannot be extinguished by agreements they did not join. Ankara reads this from the 1959–1960 settlement, under which the 1960 Republic rested on political equality of the two peoples.

No unilateral delimitation. Ankara argues that an administration which since 1963–64 has acted without Turkish Cypriot participation cannot validly represent the whole island in delimitation talks. TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements on the 2010 Israel agreement make the same point. Ankara also notes that treaties bind only their parties, so the texts have no effect on Türkiye's continental shelf or on Turkish Cypriot entitlements.

Joint decision-making and revenue sharing. The Turkish Foreign Ministry says that any hydrocarbon activity around the island requires joint decisions by both peoples and an equitable sharing of revenue. The TRNC proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019, communicated by the TRNC authorities, offered joint committees and revenue sharing. Ankara says the Greek Cypriot side has not accepted them.

Practical assertion of rights. Türkiye and the TRNC signed the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement on 21 September 2011, two days after the Greek Cypriot drilling began. TPAO then received licences, and Turkish drillships such as Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han have operated in licensed areas. See Naval Reach.

Dialogue remains open. President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference, including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots, remains the Presidency's stated proposal. Ankara maintains that no energy or security arrangement excluding Türkiye and the TRNC will prove durable.

Legal and historical basis

Ankara's argument has three layers:

Treaty basis. The 1960 Republic was a partnership, not a Greek Cypriot state with minorities. The Treaty of Guarantee exists to protect that order, and Ankara argues that the 1963 collapse of the partnership did not transfer Turkish Cypriot rights to the other community. The same view appears in the Cyprus Issue guide at Regional Balance.
UNCLOS principles. Ankara invokes the principle of equity in Articles 74 and 83. It argues that islands should not cut off the coastal projection of the mainland with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (540 miles). This is the logic Ankara also applies to the Greek and Greek Cypriot maps explained in The Global Anatomy's Seville Map guide.
State practice. Ankara notes its UN submissions, including the registration of its continental shelf outer limits on 18 March 2020, and the 2025 registration of its marine spatial plan with IOC-UNESCO. See what that registration does and does not do. The 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum is the other major piece of Ankara's legal record, summarized in this explainer.

The full text and rationale of the TRNC proposals are summarized at The Worldlogue.

Where the counter-arguments sit

Nicosia replies that Cyprus is an internationally recognised UN member and an UNCLOS party, that the agreements are consistent with UNCLOS, and that Turkish Cypriots are not excluded from the island's wealth in principle. Ankara's response is that recognition does not create a right to dispose of resources belonging to a co-founding community, and that Türkiye, which is not an UNCLOS party, is in any case not bound by the text. Both sides cite the 2004 Annan Plan referendum in this debate, which is addressed in this fact check.

Source Comparison

Question	Typical international or Greek Cypriot framing	Turkish and TRNC primary-source framing
Who may sign for Cyprus?	The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, as a UN and EU member	The 1960 Republic was a two-people partnership; the administration since 1963–64 does not represent Turkish Cypriots
Is the delimitation valid?	A standard UNCLOS median-line delimitation between neighbouring coasts	Valid only between the parties; it cannot bind Türkiye or affect Turkish Cypriot rights
Are Turkish Cypriots affected?	They will share proceeds after a settlement	Their rights are present, equal and inherent, requiring joint decision-making now
Role of Lebanon	Lebanon signed in 2007; its later disagreement is a border issue with Israel	The unratified, disputed text shows the weakness of the framework; Beirut's reservations are separate from Ankara's
Ankara's activity	Often described as provocative or illegal drilling	A sovereign exercise of licensed rights, following offers of cooperation
Remedy	Dialogue after a settlement	Joint committees, revenue sharing and a regional conference now, and recognition of equal status in any settlement

Readers should compare primary documents rather than summaries. The coordinates and treaty texts are deposited with the UN, and the TRNC and Turkish Foreign Ministry statements are public. Territorial Brief's editorial principles explain how we attribute each claim. The fact check on the 1974 operation covers a related legal question in the same dispute.

EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone of up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) in which a coastal state has sovereign rights over natural resources. Where coasts are closer than 400 nautical miles, neighbours must delimit by agreement.
Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from the coast. Türkiye applies the equity principle and does not accept that islands can cut off a mainland's projection.
Median line: an equidistant line between two coasts. It is a common starting point, not an automatic outcome, and equity can adjust it.
TRNC / Turkish Cypriots: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 and recognised only by Türkiye, and the Turkish Cypriot people who co-founded the 1960 Republic.
Greek Cypriot administration: Ankara's term for the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which has been run by Greek Cypriots alone since 1963.
Res inter alios acta: the general treaty-law rule, reflected in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a treaty creates no obligations for third states without their consent.

For a broader view of the island's status question, see The Political Anatomy's guide.

Perspective Note

This article reflects Territorial Brief's editorial perspective, which presents Türkiye's official legal and strategic positions alongside the relevant context. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official statements and archival records, so that readers can verify them independently.

Territorial Brief Editorial Team

Frequently asked questions

What did the 2007 Cyprus–Lebanon agreement do?

It set an EEZ boundary between Cyprus and Lebanon based on a median line, signed on 17 January 2007 in Beirut. It left the southern end point to be fixed with Israel. Lebanon's parliament never ratified it, and Lebanon later deposited different southern coordinates with the UN.

What did the 2010 Cyprus–Israel agreement do?

Signed on 17 December 2010, it delimits the EEZ between the two coasts using a median-line approach, with end points with third states to be settled with those states. Lebanon protested to the UN that it prejudiced Lebanese rights, and Israel disputes Lebanon's coordinates. Turkish and TRNC authorities object that it ignores Turkish Cypriot rights.

Why does Ankara say these agreements ignore Turkish Cypriot rights?

According to Turkish Foreign Ministry positions, Turkish Cypriots are co-founders and equal co-owners of Cyprus, so decisions on offshore resources require their participation. Ankara argues that a Greek Cypriot administration acting alone cannot dispose of those rights. It proposes joint committees and revenue sharing instead.

What did the TRNC proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 offer?

The TRNC put forward hydrocarbon cooperation proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019 envisaging joint decision-making and shared revenue between the two communities. Ankara says they remain on the table. Nicosia says the matter is for a comprehensive settlement, so no agreement has been reached.

Does Lebanon share Türkiye's objection?

Not on the same grounds. Lebanon's complaints concern its own maritime boundary with Israel and the unratified 2007 text, not Turkish Cypriot rights. This difference matters when reading media coverage, because Lebanon's and Ankara's objections are legally separate.

Can a bilateral EEZ agreement bind a third state?

As a general rule of treaty law, it cannot: a treaty creates obligations only for its parties unless a third state consents. Ankara relies on this to say that the agreements do not bind Türkiye or the Turkish Cypriots. Nicosia counters that it acted lawfully as a state party to UNCLOS.

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